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NOTES AND COMMENTS
by a judge normally will not be adequate, because he has neither the
strong interest nor the full knowledge that is required for effective cross
examination.25 A verdict is at stake. It is a substantial right,26 born
of evidence, that has been subjected to a system of procedural checks and
balances, and its merit deliberated and judged by twelve men. The
elaborate process of the law which produced it should provide the basic
right of cross examination to protect it.
New trials are not favored in the eyes of the law and should not be
granted in an arbitrary manner. It is felt that the methods used in the
Williams case were not based on logic and reason and should have been
considered an abuse of discretion. This case results in giving the trial
court an unusual amount of control over the regulation of a hearing for
a new trial. Perhaps the court feels that it is a wiser policy to give the
trial court a wide latitude in such hearing and that their expressed dis-
approval of the proceedings in the Williams case would be enough to
prevent its recurrence. However, it would seem that until a firmer stand
has been taken on the issues involved this case establishes a dangerous
precedent.
JOHN MARK TAPLEY.
Unemployment Insurance-Availability for Suitable Work-Effect of
Claimant's Refusal to Work on Sabbath
Claimant, a textile worker of thirteen years' experience, became inter-
ested in the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and, as a result, became
convinced that she should not work on the Sabbath, which, in the Seventh
Day Adventist Church, is from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.
On at least one Sabbath, she was excused from work by her employer,
but on another Friday, she stayed away from her employment without
permission and was discharged for such absence. Within a week she
filed a claim for benefits under the Employment Security Act. During
her period of unemployment, she sought work in other mills in the area
but restricted her availability to the first shift, the only shift that would
not interfere with her Sabbath, and freely admitted that she would not
consider employment which would require her to work on her Sabbath.
The Employment Security Commission held that the claimant was
not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits by the circum-
stances of her discharge, that she was able to work and that she had made
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 402, 406, 235 S. W. 2d 347, 350 (1950) ;
Southern Arizona Freight Lines v. Jackson, 48 Ariz. 509, 63 P. 2d 193 (1936) ; Re'
Murray's Estate, 238 Iowa 112, 26 N. W. 2d 58 (1947) ; Anno., 23 A. L. R. 2d 846
(1952).
5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1368 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
.' Edwards v. Hood Motor Co. 235 N. C. 269, 69 S. E. 2d 550 (1952) ; Bundy v.
Sutton, 207 N. C. 422, 177 S. E. 420 (1934).
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an active and reasonable search for work; but that, by restricting her
availability to first shift employment only, she had "so limited the cir-
cumstances under which she would accept work as substantially to elimi-
nate herself from consideration for potential job opportunities.... ." The
Commission also found that 95% of the job openings in the area were
for the third shift, that textile mills normally run from Monday morning
through Friday night, that new employees are normally given second and
third shift work and promoted to first shift employment. Thus, the
Commission held her ineligible for benefits, and this decision was af-
firmed by the Superior Court of Rowan County. On appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded.' The court held
that to interpret the statutes as the Commission had done would require
a claimant, in order to be eligible for benefits, to be available for work
"at any and all times, night and day, Sunday and week days alike," and
would also render G. S. 96-13 and G. S. 96-14 inconsistent. The court
concluded that the language of G. S. 96-13 does not sustain the strict
interpretation applied by the Commission. The words, "available for
work," as used in G. S. 96-13 mean "available for suitable work" in the
same sense as the words "suitable work" are used in the cognate statute
G. S. 96-14. The court held that "work which requires one to violate
his moral standards is not ordinarily suitable work within the meaning
of the statute," and that the claimant, by refusing to consider employment
which would require work on her Sabbath, did not render herself un-
available for work within the meaning of the statute since such work
would have been unsuitable for her.
This seems to be the first occasion on which the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has passed, in definite terms, on the scope and meaning of
the term "available for work"--one of the requisites for eligibility for
benefits under the Employment Security Act. It is certainly a case of
first impression in North Carolina on a claimant's eligibility for benefits
where he has, for religious reasons, placed a restriction on his availability.
A claimant's religious beliefs might affect his eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits in several respects. These beliefs might influence the de-
termination where the problem under consideration would be (1) volun-
tary leaving, where it would enter into the determination of the effect of
claimant's religious beliefs on good cause, (2) refusal of work, where the
religious beliefs would enter into the determination of the "suitability"
of the offered work, and, (3) availability for work, where, as in the
Miller case, religious beliefs caused the claimant to restrict her availa-
bility. This note will be limited primarily to a discussion of these three
factors against the background of a brief history of unemployment in-
surance laws, their purpose and interpretation.
'In re Miller, 243 N. C. 509, 91 S. E. 2d 438 (1956).
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North Carolina passed its Unemployment Compensation Law in
1936 ;2 by 1937 all forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Alaska
and Hawaii had passed similar legislation, pursuant to the Federal Social
Security Act.3 In August, 1935, the United States Congress, by an over-
whelming bipartisan vote, had passed the Social Security Act, which,
by Title III and Title IX, laid the framework for the new program of
unemployment insurance.4 The federal act levied a tax on employers in
industry and commerce, and, by means of a "tax offset," made it advan-
tageous for the states to enact state laws which would pay unemployment
benefits.5 This new program of unemployment insurance was designed
to be on a federal-state basis, rather than on a federal basis like the
Federal Old-Age Insurance program. It contemplated federal-state co-
operation, but the federal government was not to make or match pay-
ments to individuals. Its grants to the states were for the proper and
efficient administration of the state unemployment laws ;6 the entire cost
of administering these programs was to be financed by federal funds.7
In this federal-state system of unemployment insurance the individual
states were free to develop the program that was most adapted to the con-
ditions of that state.8 Since each state legislature enacted its own laws,
specifying the workers to be covered, the taxes the employers would pay,
the benefits to be paid, the requirements for receipt of benefits, and the
organization within the state government to administer the law,9 the
laws vary greatly from state to state. However, the states generally
agree as to the purpose of the unemployment insurance laws, which is
said to be to provide relief'0 or protection against involuntary unemploy-
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96 (1950). N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 598, s. 1, substituted
"Employment Security Law" for "Unemployment Compensation Law." Hereafter
in this note, North Carolina's Law will be referred to as the "Employment Security
Law," other state laws by their titles, while the generic terms "unemployment in-
surance" and "unemployment compensation" will apply to both.
'U. S. EMPLOYMENT SERvICE, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U. S. D'T
OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SEcuRITY REVIEw, vol. 22, no. 8, Twenty Years of Un-
employment Insurance in the U. S. A. 1935-1955 9 (1955). Hereafter all jursidic-
tions will be called "states" in accordance with the definition of state in sec. 1101
of the Social Security Act, and in sec. 1607(j) of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act.
'Ibid.
'Ibid. "The Federal Act . . . provided that when a State had an approved
unemployment insurance law, its employers could credit the taxes they paid to the
State against 90 per cent of the Federal Tax."0 Dw. or R~sEA~cHr AND STxrATICS, SOCIAL SEcIlTY ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDucATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY BULETI, vol. 18, no. 12,
Twenty Years of Unemployment Insurance 3 (1955).
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY RVIEW, op. cit. supra note 3 at 9.8 Dr. OF DETERMINATIONS AND HEARINGS, UNEMIPLOYMkENT INSURANCE SERVICE.BUInAU OF EMPLOYCENT SECURITY, U. S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON Or STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, Preface III (1954).
o EMmLOYMENT SECURITY REVIEW, Op. cit supra note 3 at 9.
1
o 
0 Mattey v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A. 2d 429 (1949).
19561
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment,": i.e., to those persons thrown out of work through no fault of their
own.
1 2
The Declaration of Public Policy of the North Carolina Employment
Security Law (which is similar to that of many other states) provides:
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter,
the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows:
"Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious men-
ace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State.
Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general inter-
est and concern which requires appropriate action by the legis-
lature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker
and his family. The achievement of social security requires pro-
tection against this greatest hazard of our our economic life. This
can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable
employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during
periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unem-
ployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the
serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legisla-
ture, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public
good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require
the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the
State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves
to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault
of their own.' 3
The North Carolina court has said of the purpose of the Law that
"From the clear language in which the underlying purposes of the Un-
employment Compensation Act are declared.., it is to be gathered that
the Legislature intended to provide a wide field of usefulness for this
agency for social security and for mitigating the economic evils of un-
employment."1 4
Although the roots of the unemployment compensation program lie
in the Poor Laws which spoke of "sturdy beggars" and "able-bodied
laborers,"' 5 it is not a public assistance program nor a "dole" system
where benefits are based upon need, but a type of social insurance, fi-
" Glover v. Simmons Co., 17 N. J. 313, 111 A. 2d 404 (1955) ; Krauss v. A. &
M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277 (1953).
2 Mohler v. Dep't of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N. E. 2d 762 (1951) ; Ackerson v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn. 271, 48 N. W. 2d 338 (1951); Nordling v.
Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N. W. 2d 576 (1950).
" N. C. GEN. STxT. § 96-2 (1950).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,
716, 15 S. E. 2d 4, 8 (1941).
"
2 ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 2 (1950).
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nanced by the persons on whom the workers are economically dependent
and providing for benefits payable without proof of need.16 Since the
program was not designed to be a public relief measure nor to "furnish
a welcome sedative to those who prefer to drift more comfortably on the
tides of indolence,"' 17 benefits are not payable to all persons who are un-
employed.' 8  Mere unemployment is not enough.19 The recepit of bene-
fits is conditioned on compliance with the requirements and conditions
prescribed by the various state statutes. Each state has certain require-
ments designed to limit payments to workers unemployed primarily as
a result of economic causes, to delineate the risks which the laws cover,20
to exclude from benefits those persons who are only casually, temporarily,
or occasionally employed,21 and to provide for the relief from the distress
of invohntary unemployment for persons who are ordinarily workers
and who would be workers now but for their inability to find jobs.22
These requirements are means of ascertaining the claimant's attach-
ment to the labor market: Is the claimant usually a worker? Has he
worked for the specified period and earned a qualifying amount of wages
in a type of employment covered by the laws? Does he have an honest
desire to become re-employed? In short, has the claimant been a worker
in the past and is he currently available for work? All states require a
claimant to demonstrate his past and present labor force attachment.23
Past labor force attachment is uniformly tested by the requirements
that a claimant must have worked in insured employment and must have
earned a specified amount of wages in such employment.24 These tests
are easily administered since they require only the application of an
arbitarary standard to the particular facts.
A claimant's present labor force attachment is more difficult to as-
certain. All states attempt to test one's present attachment to the labor
force by requiring that he be "able to work and available for work," and
twenty-six states, including North Carolina, require, in addition, that
he actively search for work.2 5 All states also require that a claimant be
"0 Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and
Policies of Protection Against Wage Loss, 8 VAND. L. REV. 218, 223 (1955).
" Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 24 N. J. Super. 277, -, 94 A. 2d 339, 342(1953).8 Neff v. Bd. of Rev., Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 52 Ohio Ops. 285, 67 Ohio L.
Abs. 276, 117 N. E. 2d 533 (1953) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463,
65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
" Glover v. Simmons Co., 17 N. J. 313, 111 A. 2d 404 (1955).
"0 COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra note
8 at 75.2 DIvISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Vol. 19, no. 1,
State Unemployment Insurance Legislation 1955, 19-20 (1956).
2 Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277. (1953).
"' ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 2. 24 Id. at 75.2
'COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra note
8 at 75; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13 (1950). See Freeman, Active Search for Work,
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free from any disqualifications under the statute.2 6 The "able to work
and available for work" tests have been described as positive conditions
for the receipt of benefits while the disqualifications are negative expres-
sions of conditions under which benefits may be denied to an otherwise
eligible claimant.27
Since the normal administrative practice in North Carolina is to con-
sider the disqualifications before passing on the eligibility of a claimant, 28
the various aspects of disqualification which might be influenced by re-
ligious beliefs will be here first considered.
Voluntary Leaving
All states, with the exception of Montana, provide for disqualification
for leaving work without good cause.29 In twenty states the good cause
must be good cause connected with the work, or attributable to the em-
ployment, or involving fault on the part of the employer; in the other
states good cause is not so restricted.30 For a voluntary leaving of em-
ployment without good cause connected with the employment, North
Carolina disqualifies a claimant for a period of from four to twelve
weeks.3 '
Two aspects of this provision seem to cause the bulk of the litigation:
(a) what constitutes voluntary leaving? and (b) what constitutes good
cause?
Some courts say that "voluntary" means a free exercise of the will.8 2
Other courts recognize that, although a worker freely decides to leave
his job, his decision need not necessarily be voluntary. 3 "The pressure
of necessity, of legal duty, or family obligations, or other overpowering
circumstances, and his capitulation to them, may transform what is osten-
sibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment. '3 4
10 OHIo ST. L. J. 181 (1949). There are other eligibility requirements, generally
as follows: (1) unemployment (2) filing of a claim (3) registering for work at a
public employment office and (4) serving a waiting period. See Williams, Eligi-
bility for Benefits, 8 VANDER L. Rzv. 286 (1955).
2" For details of the variations in state laws on disqualification, see COMPARISON
OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANcE LAWS, op. cit. supra note 8 Tables 23-31
and Chapter IV generally. See Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving
and Misconduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147 (1945) ; Sanders, Disqualifications for Unem-
ployment Insurance, 8 VANDER. L. REV. 307 (1955).
17 ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 75.
2 6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. -8243, Employment Security Commission
Statement of Policy no. 54 (1954).29 Montana disqualifies for any voluntary leaving-with or without good cause.
20 COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANE LAWS, op. Cit. supra note
8 at 80-84.2 1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(a) (Supp. 1955).
22 State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S. E. 2d 198 (1949).
22 Craig v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 83 Ohio App. 247, 83 N. E. 2d 628 (1948);
Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898
(1946).
"
4 Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 119 Ind. App.
191, -, 84 N. E. 2d 895, 897 (1949).
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Once it has been determined that a claimant has quit his job, and that
he has done so voluntarily, then it must be ascertained whether this vol-
untary leaving of employment was with good cause. It should be noted
that the factors constituting good cause will differ in the various juris-
dictions in light of the fact that 20 states require the good cause to be
connected with the work.35 It seems that personal reasons would more
often constitute "good cause" in those jurisdictions where the criterion is
not restricted to causes connected with the employment.
The Attorney General of North Carolina has given an interpretation
of good cause for the use of the North Carolina Employment Security
Commission:
"In ascertaining whether or not an employee voluntarily left
his employment, it would be justifiable to consider the mental
processes, constraining or compulsive forces or objective influ-
ences, or the freedom or lack of freedom from external compul-
sion or necessity which led up to the claimant's leaving work, but
the Commission should in every case be fully satisfied that, where
an employee has left the employment, the reasons for so doing were
of an impelling character, which, in the opinion of the Commis-
sion, afforded ample and complete justification for the severance of
his employment. This would exclude all fictitious or feigned rea-
sons or excuses for failure to continue in the work and would
comprehend only such causes as operated directly on the employee
which made, in the opinion of the Commission, his continuance in
employment impossible, or attended with such circumstances as to
make it unreasonably burdensome for him to continue therein."36
A Pennsylvania decision contains a discussion of good cause:
"... 'good cause' must be so interpreted that the fundamental pur-
pose of the legislature shall not be destroyed. Even in matters
connected with his employment there must be some limit to the
legally approved list of good causes for quitting employment. The
quitting must be such a cause as would reasonably motivate in a
similar situation the average able-bodied and qualified worker to
give up his or her employment with its certain wage rewards in
order to enter the ranks of the 'compensated unemployed.' ...
"An employee may contend that the character and habits of
his fellow employees are distasteful to him, he may contend that
the work he is engaged in (such as making of war munitions or
- See note 30 supra; See also, Kempfer, Disqualifications for Vohntary Leav-
ing and Misconduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147 (1945) and Sanders, Disqalification for
Unemployntent Inurance, 8 VANDER. L. REV. 307 (1955).
" 6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. 1975.01 (1944).
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alcoholic beverages) offends his religious or moral principles, or
he may contend that his family objects to his working in a job in
which he becomes begrimed with dirt yet these and similar rea-
sons cannot be legally accepted as 'good cause' for leaving one's
employment....
"If every reason which appealed to an employee's head or
heart is to be accepted as a good cause for his or her voluntarily
leaving a job in a locality where there is no other work available,
the Unemployment Compensation Law will become in many in-
stances an invitation to a compensated rest. 3 7
The courts are not in agreement as to what constitutes good cause.88
Would a claimant's religious beliefs constitute good cause for leaving
employment? It seems that those states which allow personal factors
to constitute good cause would be more likely to allow compensation to
a claimant who quit for religious reasons than would those which require
that the good cause be "good cause connected with the work or attribu-
table to the employment, or involving fault on the part of the employer."
Apparently there have been few decisions at the state supreme court
level which have discussed this particular problem. One court held that
a claimant had left work voluntarily without good cause where, in spite
of having been told that he could not have time off for a religious holiday
because the union contract prevented using a substitute, he nevertheless
took the day off.39
This question has been before the various state unemployment com-
missions. Generally, though not always, the commissions have held that
a claimant who has left work for religious reasons has voluntarily severed
the employment relation but with good cause and hence is not disquali-
" Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 358 Pa.
224, 237, 56 A. 2d 254, 260 (1948).
" Claimant held to have had good cause for leaving employment when the leav-
ing was for the following reasons: to take sick wife back to her home community,
Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Rev. Bd., 119 Ind. App. 191, 84 N. E. 2d 895 (1949) ;
because employer failed to pay wages promptly, Deshla Broom Factory v. Kinney,
140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. 2d 332 (1942) ; because of family obligations, Wolfson v.
Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 167 Pa. Super. 588, 76 A. 2d 498 (1950) ; to join hus-
band in another locality, It re Teicher, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. 2d 739 (1944) ;
because minor claimant's parents insisted she accompany them to California, West-
ern Printing and Lithographing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 260 Wis. 124, 50 N. W.
2d 410 (1951).
Claimant held not to have had good case for leaving employment when the
leaving was for the following reasons: because of dissatisfaction with earnings,
Dep't of Ind. Rev. v. Scott, 36 Ala. 184, 53 So. 2d 882 (1951) ; to get married,
Moore v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 73 Ohio App. 362, 56 N. E. 2d 520 (1943) ; to
join husband in another city, Stone Mfg. Co. v. S. C. Emp. Sec. Comm., 219 S. C.
239, 64 S. E. 2d 644 (1951) ; to care for young children, Judson Mills v. S. C. Un-
emp. Comp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (1944) ; because of increase in
duties, In re Anderson, 39 Wash. 2d 356, 235 P. 2d 303 (1951).
" Mee's Bakery v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 169 Pa. Super. 7, 82 A. 2d 68
(1951).
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fled.40 These findings by the commissions seem to be well reasoned.
Religious beliefs causing the severance of employment clearly appear to
be the kind of "necessitous and compelling" 41 reasons that transform
voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment, the compensa-
tion of which is one of the basic purposes of the unemployment insurance
acts.
42
It is significant to note that although a person may be determined to
have voluntarily left his employment with good cause and thus not be
disqualified, it is possible that he may still be held ineligible for benefits
because of unavailability. The same causes which justify a claimant in
leaving employment may also prevent his being held available,4 3 depend-
ing upon the extent to which his severing of the employment relation
indicates an intention on his part to withdraw from the labor market.44
Refusal of Work
All states provide for disqualification for refusal of work; the statutes
contain diverse provisions concerning the extent of the disqualification,
factors to be considered in determining whether work is or is not suitable
and whether the claimant has good cause for refusing it, and the pro-
visions under which new work may be'refused4 5
States are required by the provisions of the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act,4 6 in order to protect labor standards, to include the so-called
"Labor Standards Provision" in their Acts. These provisions are stand-
ard throughout the states, and North Carolina's provisions would seem
to be typical:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no
work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied
,0 See, e.g., Ben. Ser. Reports, 3963, N. Y. A (1952) ; 3759, N. Y. B (1952);
589, Pa. B (1950). This refers to Benefit Series Service, Unemployment Insurance,
which is prepared by the Division of Determinations and Hearings, Bureau of
Employment Security, U. S. Dep't of Labor. This service contains reports of sig-
nificant administrative and court decisions.
"1 Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d
898 (1946) ; Flannick v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A. 2d
671 (1951). See also Homing v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 177 Pa. Super. 618,
112 A. 2d 405 (1955).
42 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1950) ; see also note 11 supra.
'
0 Hoffstot v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 43, 63 A. 2d 355
(1949).
" Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277 (1953).
An example of this would be where the claimant left his employment because of
illness. In cases of this type, his ineligibility for benefits would only extend to
the time when the factor causing the unavailability was abated, as contrasted with
a predetermined period which would have been the case had he been held dis-
qualified.
' COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANCE LAws, op. cit. supra note
8 at 88. See Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134 (1945);
Machuga, Suitable Work under Unemployment Compensation Statutes, 10 OHIo
ST. L. J. 232 (1949).
"' SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 3.
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under this chapter to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing
to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (a) If
the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute; (b) if the remuneration, hours, or other con-
ditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the
individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
(c) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor organization. '47
Most statutes, in addition to the labor standards provisions, contain
rather standardized criteria for ascertaining the suitability of the work
offered.48 North Carolina's tests are:
"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an indi-
vidual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved
to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training, his experience and prior training, his experience and
prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for se-
curing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of
the available work from his residence." 49
Under the provisions of the statutes in forty-seven jurisdictions, a
person is disqualified when he fails without good cause to apply for
available and suitable work to which he is directed,50 or to accept suitable
work when proffered to him ;51 in the four remaining jurisdictions, he
may be disqualified for refusal without good cause to accept an offer
of employment for which he is reasonably fitted by experience and train-
ing.52 Here again the disqualification period and factors in determining
disqualification vary from state to state.5 3
47 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (Supp. 1955).
,New York and Delaware disqualify for refusals of work for which the claim-
ant is reasonably fitted and Montana and Wyoming disqualify for refusal of work
for which he is physically and mentally qualified.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1) (Supp. 1955). For details in the various states
see Table 26, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS, op. cit.
supra note 8 at 90.
oBigger v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 4 Ter. [Del.] 553, 53 A. 2d 761 (1947);
Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Rev. Bd. of Emp. Sec. Div., 114
Ind. App. 475, 51 N. E. 2d 891 (1943) ; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Comm.,
349 Mo. 590, 162 S. W. 2d 838 (1942); Hanna v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev ,
172 Pa. Super. 417, 94 A. 2d 178 (1953).
" Bigger v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., supra note 53; Muncie Foundry Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Rev. Bd. of Emp. Sec. Div., mtpra note 53; see also Pacific
Mills v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. Sec., 322 Mass. 345, 77 N. E. 2d 413 (1948).
" Claim of Delgado, 278 App. Div. 237, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (3d Dep't 1951);
Claim of Greaser, 279 App. Div. 702, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (3d Dep't 1951) ; Claim
of Crowe, 280 App. Div. 427, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (3d Dep't 1952).
" COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS, op. cit. supra note
8 at 90.
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Religious beliefs are given effect under the provision that the commis-
sions are to consider the "risk to claimant's morals." As one writer
pointed out: "This element is frequently viewed broadly to give effect
to ofie's moral precepts regardless of their consistency with prevailing
ethical standards.... In order to make the work unsuitable, however,
the connection between the condition pertaining to the job and the claim-
ant's moral principles should be direct and not fanciful or nebulous. ' 54
In the usual case based on refusal of work for religious reasons, the re-
ligious views of the claimant are certainly not inconsistent with the cur-
rent ethical standards of a sizable minority.55 The states uniformly
require the claimant to establish the sincerity of his religious beliefs;
the element of good faith permeates every area of unemployment com-
pensation, and where claimant has not acted in good faith or in further-
.ance of a conscientious religious belief, compensation has been denied.56
Recently the Ohio courts had occasion to consider, in the case of Tary
v. Board of Review5 7 the effect of a claimant's refusal of employment
for religious reasons. In this case the claimant was a conscientious mem-
ber of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. When her job, which had
required no Saturday work, terminated, she applied for and received
unemployment benefits until she refused a job referral because it would
have required her to work half-day on her Sabbath. The administrator
thereupon suspended her benefits; the referee affirmed this finding; the
board of review disallowed her application for further appeal.
Claimant thereupon appealed to the court of common pleas which
reversed the action of the board of review; this was affirmed by the court
of appeals, and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, was once again
affirmed.
The court pointed out that, when Kut v. Albers Super Markets Inc.5 8
(an earlier Ohio decision involving religious beliefs) was decided, the
Act in Ohio required the claimant to be available for work in his usual
trade or occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for which he was
reasonably fitted. However, by a 1949 amendment, the Act was amended
to require claimant to be available for suitable work and to be ineligible
for benefits for refusal without good cause to accept an offer of suitable
work. It also provided that, in determining whether work was suitable,
the degree of risk to claimant's morals was to be considered.
The court noted that this amendment made Ohio's statute in accord
Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134, 144 (1945).
Usually cases based on refusal of work for religious reasons involve Orthodox
J'ews or Seventh Day Adventists since their Sabbath is on Saturday.
" See Ben. Ser. Report 9021-Mass. A (1955).
17 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N. E. 2d 56 (1954); See Note, 30 NOTRE DAME LAw.
176 (1955) ; Note, 8 VANDER. L. REv. 519 (1955).
, 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N. E. 2d 643, appeal dismissed 329 U. S. 669, rehearing
denied 329 U. S. 827 (1946).
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with those of other states where the provisions had been interpreted to
excuse rejection of proffered employment if it would involve a violation
of claimant's religious conscience and tend to offend his morals and con-
tinued: "It is our interpretation that the General Assembly intended,
by the 1949 Amendment, to confer rights based upon bona fide moral
convictions. Conscientious religious beliefs constitute an integral part
of an individual's morals."5ssa
It seems probable that courts in other jurisdictions would reach the
same result as the Ohio court did in the preceding case since forty-seven
jurisdictions require acceptance of suitable work only and generally pro-
vide very similar criteria for ascertaining this suitability. 59 The commis-
sion decisions reflect a well settled rule in most jurisdictions that a con-
flict with a claimant's religious views renders the work unsuitable,60
although there are decisions to the contrary.61
In the four states which have no suitability requirement it would
seem theoretically possible that a claimant could be disqualified for the
refusal of a job even if it violated his religious beliefs. There are appar-
ently no state supreme court decisions from these states on this point
but the administrative decisions do not indicate that such a result has
been reached.62
Able to Work and Available for Work
The "able to work" requirement seems to cause no great difficulties.
The variations from state to state are minor: some states require a
claimant to be "physically able" or "mentally and physically able" but
the effect of these variations is negligible.63 This requisite is said to be
present to distinguished unemployment insurance from workmen's com-
pensation or health insurance.6 4  "Generally speaking 'able' refers to
mental attitudes and physical capabilities of claimant. . ".."05 Normally
this requirement has been leniently interpreted to allow benefits to physi-
cally disabled persons unless they are utterly incapable of working.('
" See notes 53, 54 and 55 supra and corresponding text.
' 7 Ben. Ser. no. 12, 9007-N. C. A (1944); 5 Ben. Ser. no. 10, 7643-Cal. A(1942); 10 Ben. Ser. no. 4, 11372-D. C. A (1947); 10 Ben. Ser. no. 2 11273-Va. A(1947); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 9596-Ky. A (1945); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 6, 9537-Pa. A
(1945); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 9, 9851-Wash. A (1945); 9 Ben. Ser. no. 4/5, 10491-Pa. R.(1946); Ben. Ser., Report, 19609-Wisc. A (1954) ; Ben. Ser., Report, 5357-Ill. B(1954).
"1 7 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 8362-Mass. A (1944); 8 Ben. Ser. no. 4, 9365-Pa. A
(1945) ; see 11 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 12207-Minn. A (1948) ; 9 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 10645-
Mich. A (1946) ; 12 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 13563-Pa. R (1949).
" See cases cited in note 60 .rupra.
"' COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, Op. cit. stpra note
8 at 75.
"' Revers v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. Sec., 323 Mass. 339, 82 N. E. 2d 1 (1948).
"Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 128
(1945).
"ALTMAN, op. cit. mtpra note 15 at 130.
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The term "available for work" is not defined in the North Carolina
Employment Security Act nor can it be defined in precise, mechanical
terms which are applicable to all cases.67 Consequently, more appeals
are taken from determinations by the administrative agencies on availa-
bility than from any other type of determination under the state unem-
ployment insurance laws.68 Although availability depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case,69 it has generally been understood that
availability is synonymous with "attachment to the labor market"70 and
that it is designed to test each claimant's attachment thereto.71
The satutory requirement that a claimant must be available for work
is not ordinarily interpreted to require total availability under all cir-
cumstances, in view of the usual stipulation that only suitable work need
be accepted and that work may be refused if good cause exists.72 How-
ever, some jurisdictions require that the claimant be exposed to the labor
market unequivocally and unrestrictedly,73 and specify that he may not
attach restrictions not customary in his occupation"4 or in the type of
employment to which he is suited.75 Thus, though it is clear that gener-
ally a claimant may impose some conditions or limitations on his em-
ployability without impairing his availability for work, 6 it is equally
clear that he may also restrict his labor to the point of unavailability. 7
Certainly claimants may not impose restrictions which in effect destroy
17 Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
o ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 4.
"See, e.g., Dep't of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So. 2d
496 (1948); Leonard v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N. E. 2d
567 (1947); Shannon v. Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 155 Ohio St. 53, 97 N. E. 2d 425
(1951).
"' Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion
of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation, 22 N. C. L. REv. 189, 28 MiNN. L.
Ruv. 387 (1944).
" See e.g., Roger v. Admin. Unemp. Comp. Act, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844
(1946) ; see also Leonard v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., supra note 69; Fleiszig
v. Bd. of Rev. of Div. of Unemp. Comp. of Dep't of Labor, 412 Ill. 49, 104 N. E.
2d 818 (1952).
" Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 456, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
"Schettino v. Admin., 138 Conn. 253, 83 A. 2d 217 (1951) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
App. Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947);
Walton v. Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App. 218, 91 N. E. 2d 373 (1950).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
" Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 456, 61 N. W.
2d 526 (1953).
"Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d
898 (1946) ; Mee's Bakery, Inc. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 162 Pa. Super. 183,
56 A. 2d 386 (1948).
"I Leclerc v. Admin. Unemp. Comp. Act, 137 Conn. 438, 78 A. 2d 550 (1951);
Jackson v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 124 Ind. App. 648, 120 N. E. 2d 413
(1954); Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Holmes, 152 Ohio St. 411, 89 N. E. 2d 580
(1949) ; Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951) ;
Jacobs v. Off. of Unemp. Comp. and Placement, 27 Wash. 2d 641, 179 P. 2d 707
(1947).
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the market for their services,78 or show their unwillingness to accept
work.79 The problem is, of course, whether or not the restrictions serve
to limit the work which a claimant can accept to such a degree that he is
no longer genuinely attached to the labor force. It is essentially a matter
of degree to ascertain to what extent a claimant can impose restrictions
and on what these restrictions must be based.
The North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission's
Statement of Policy No. 6 provides: "Whenever a claimant so limits the
circumstances under which he would accept work as substantially to
eliminate himself from consideration for potential job opportunities, he
shall be considered unavailable for work."80
The courts, as a rule, have dealt harshly and critically with claimants
who restrict their employability. One court has said that the laws were
never intended to guarantee a claimant employment shackled with each
and every condition he might impose.8 ' Claimants have been held in-
eligible where they restricted their availability to certain hours,82 types
of work,83 working conditions, 4 and wages, 5 to mention only a few of
the more common restrictions.
Restrictions to a particular shift pose one of the most difficult prob-
lems in availability. Women have most often been the claimants who
have imposed restrictions on their availability. 6 This is understandable
because generally it is the woman who must remain in the home during
certain hours or days to perform her domestic duties and therefore it is
she who most frequently imposes conditions, particularly restrictions as
to time. However, the courts have usually dealt harshly with these
claimants. As one court said: "It is held in most jurisdictions which
have dealt with the matter (or with analagous problems) that a female
worker may not limit her availability to a certain shift or period of time
because she must care for her children at other times."87  Usually a
"8 Goings v. Riley, 98 N. H. 93, 95 A. 2d 137 (1953) ; Robinson v. Md. Emp.
Sec. Bd., 202 Md. 515, 97 A. 2d 300 (1953).
" Robinson v. Md. Emp. Sec. Bd., supra note 78; Freeman, Able to Work and
Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123 (1945).
"06 CCH UxEmP. INs. REP., N. C. ff 1950.11, Unemp. Comp. Comm. Statement
of Policy No. 6 (1942).
"In re Krieger, 279 App. Div. 681, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 916 (3d Dep't 1951).
"
2 Leclerc v. Admin., 137 Conn. 438, 78 A. 2d 550 (1951) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
App. Bd. of Mich., Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947);
Judson Mills v. S. C. Unemp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (1944) ; Keen
v. Texas Unemp. Comp. Comm., 148 S. W. 2d 211 (Texas Civ. App. 1941).8 Haynes v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S. W. 2d 77 (1944);
Claim of Delgado, 278 App. Div. 237, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (3d Dep t 1951) ; Unemp.
Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).8
,Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
8 0 Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N. H. 48, 45 A. 2d 886 (1946). 6 CCH UNEMP. INs.
REP. N. C. -8213 New Matters 111950 (1952).88 ALTMAiq, op. cit. supra note 15 at 230.87Tung-Sol Elec. Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Emp. Sec., Dep't of Labor and
Industry, 35 N. J. Super. 397, 114 A. 2d 285 (1955) and cases cited therein.
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claimant stands a better chance of being found available when the limi-
tation is to the first shift,88 although there are decisions to the contrary.
The North Carolina Employment Security Commission's decisions reflect
the same attitude as that of the courts.8 9
In considering the effect of one's religious beliefs on availability, it
should be remembered that the availability requirement is designed to
test the claimant's attachment to the labor market. Therefore, if a claim-
ant's religious-inspired restriction does not serve to take him out of the
labor market, he should be held available. That was the theory of the
Michigan court in the case of Swenson v. Michigan Employment Se-
curity Commission:9" The claimants were Seventh Day Adventists who,
prior to their lay-off, had been in the employ of two or more concerns in
Battle Creek, where thousands of Seventh Day Adventists were employed
on a full time basis. In their applications for unemployment benefits,
they indicated that they could not, because of their religious beliefs, work
from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. The Commission held them
ineligible for failure to establish their availability. The referee set aside
the Commission's determination. The appeal board reversed the referee
and the circuit court reversed the appeal board. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, claimants were found available for work and
entitled to benefits under the Act.
The court pointed out that the claimants had neither been offered nor
had they refused employment. The court distinguished the Koski case9 '
(an earlier Michigan case involving a restriction as to time) on the facts
as not involving a religious question and pointed out that the decision in
the Tary92 case had changed Ohio's position from that held in the Kut
case.
93
The court quoted from the circuit court's opinion:
"The law is designed to apply to all situations within its contem-
plation, and the Commission's attitude, if upheld, would com-
pletely exclude thousands of citizens of this state from the benefits
of the Act. That could never have been the intent of the legisla-
ture; nor should we construe the Act as to accomplish that result.
Furthermore, we suggest that the policy of this state in this matter
has been definitely established by the legislature in the language of
the statute.
88 ALTMAN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 230.
"6 CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. N. C. New Matters 1950; 8209 (1952); 8213
(1952) ; 8214 (1952) ; 8283 (1955) ; 8296 (1956) ; 8246 (1954).
0340 Mich. 430, 65 N. W. 2d 709 (1954).
"Ford Motor Co. v. App. Bd. of Mich. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich. 418,
25 N. W. 2d 586 (1947).
'2 See note 57 smpra.
"Kut v. Albers Super Markets Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N. E. 2d 643 (1946).
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"'To exclude such persons would be arbitrary discrimination
when there is not sound foundation, in fact, for the distinctions
and the purposes of and theory of the Act are not thereby served.
Seventh Day Adventists, as a matter of fact, do not remove them-
selves from the labor market by stopping work on sundown Fri-
day and not resuming work until sundown Saturday, as is ap-
parent from the reason that employers do hire them.' "3a
Another possible theory of holding a claimant who has placed a limi-
tion on his availability because of religious convictions to be available
nonetheless is to decide that a claimant need be available for suitable
work only. Once this position is reached the court can then apply the
usual criteria for the determination of suitability, one of which is to con-
sider the risk to claimant's morals, and find that the work which would
violate a claimant's conscientious religious beliefs is unsuitable for him,
with a consequent finding of availability. This was the theory employed
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Miller case.
Only seven states by statute require that a claimant be available for
suitable work only.94 However, the majority view seems to be, even
without such a statutory requirement, that the availability test is met
when claimant is available for suitable work which he does not have good
cause to refuse-when he is genuinely attached to the labor force. 95
Thus, as a matter of actual practice, many other states require availability
for suitable work only. It would appear that by the Miller decision
North Carolina now falls into this latter group. G. S. 96-13 contains
the standard availability requirement that a claimant, in order to be
eligible for benefits, must be available for work, but availability is not de-
fined. The Miller case apparently gave the North Carolina Supreme
Court the first occasion for applying the concept of suitability as found
in G. S. 96-14, the section on disqualifications, to the interpretation of
availability, a requisite for eligibility, as found in G. S. 96-13. However,
early commission decisions reflect that it has long been the policy of the
commission to require availability for suitable work only. 0
This decision would seem sound in that it aligns North Carolina with
... Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 340 Mich. 430, 437,
65 N. W. 2d 709, 712 (1954). The latter paragraph was quoted from the circuit
court's opinion.9 Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, North Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
" Reger v. Admin., 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844 (1946) ; Claim of Sapp, 75
Idaho 65, 266 P. 2d 1027 (1954) ; Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N. E. 2d
183 (1952) ; Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. Zd 277
(1953).
",1 Ben. Ser. no. 8, 704-N. C. A (1938); 5 Ben. Ser. no. 2, 6963-N. C. A
(1942). However in one case in another jurisdiction, the Board of Review was
reversed by the court for requiring availability for suitable work only, in absence
of express statutory authority for so doing. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Bd. of Rev.,
Bureau of Unemp. Comp., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. 2d 152 (1942).
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the majority interpretation of availability, makes this provision more
flexible to the needs of the workers, provides for minority claimants'
free exercise of their religious and moral beliefs and affirms the policy
of the Commission to require availability for suitable work only.
Had the court not applied the concept of suitability to the meaning of
availability, a contrary result would probably have been reached or if the
same result had been reached, it would have been an exception 97 to the
general interpretations. In considering this case it is important to re-
member that here, unlike the Swenson case, supra, which the court cited
and approved, the claimant had removed herself from 95% of the labor
market by being available for first shift work only when the custom in
the local labor market was to hire new employees for second and third
shifts only. Ordinarily these factors would have necessitated a finding
of unavailability; however, the court was not faced with this issue since
their initial finding was that the work was not suitable for the claimant.98
Having adopted this view the court should experience no difficulty
in following the Tary case, supra, if given a similar set of facts, nor
should it encounter any difficulty in holding that religious reasons consti-
tute good cause for voluntarily leaving employment.
This case constitutes a liberal interpretation of the North Carolina
Employment Security Law and a realistic judicial recognition of facts
which cause claimants to restrict their employability. It should enable
the North Carolina courts to give the Law a broad and liberal construc-
tion to aid in "mitigating the economic evils of unemployment." 99
THOMAS P. WALKER.
Workmen's Compensation-Death of Nightwatchman as Arising Out
of and in the Course of Employment
In a proceeding under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act
the evidence shoVed that a nightwatchman was murdered while drinking
coffee in a drive-in 25 feet from the premises of his employer and
100 yards from the building he was required to watch. The murder
occurred about 4:00 A.M., which was during the hours of his employ-
ment. The employer had not given him permission to leave the premises
but had given him permission to drink coffee on the premises. Compen-
sation was allowed on the grounds that the injury arose by accident out
of and in the course of the employment.' This is typical of some of the
" 1 ALTair, AVAiLABmirY FOR WoRK, 180 (1950).
"' But See 12 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 13545-N. C. R (1949) ; 7 Ben. Ser. no. 12, 9007-
N. C. A (1944).
" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,
15 S. E. 2d 4 (1941).
' U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Croft, - Ga. App. -, 91 S. E. 2d 110 (1955).
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